

## XENOPHON AND CALLICRATIDAS\*

DESPITE increasingly sophisticated theoretical debate, scholars concerned with ancient historiography effectively still divide into two camps: historians, who want to use the texts as sources and assess them by criteria of accuracy, reliability, completeness of record and presence or absence of prejudice according to their presumed relationship to the facts which they purport to represent; and literary scholars, who want to interpret the texts as texts, with their own internal logic.<sup>1</sup>

Thus historians generally still view Xenophon's *Hellenica* as a very poor relation of Thucydides' *History* (regarded as the supreme masterpiece of ancient historiography), on the ground that the *Hellenica* is seriously distorted by prejudice, indifference to establishing facts, narrow perspective, moralising, etc.<sup>2</sup> By contrast, literary scholars see it as a work of literary distinction, whose concern with the representation of 'the facts' is far from straightforward.<sup>3</sup> Both camps, however, agree on the work's strong moralising tendency.

Xenophon's portrayal in Book 1 of the Spartan navarch Callicratidas has evoked particularly diverse responses. Grote, Underhill, Breitenbach, Westlake, J.K. Anderson, Cawkwell, Bommelaer, Ronnet and Cartledge regard it as strongly favourable, whereas Higgins, Gray and Krentz regard it as strongly unfavourable. Somewhere in the middle are Tuplin, who regards the portrayal as mixed, and Proietti, who sees rather a study of practicalities, in which traditional Spartan values (some genuinely noble) cannot cope with the new complexities posed by Sparta's need to wage a naval war in the east and to finance it with Persian help.<sup>4</sup>

Three points emerge.

First, it is almost exclusively literary scholars who expound the anti-Callicratidas view.<sup>5</sup>

Second, historians generally read the text in a very 'external' way. Thus Westlake: 'Xenophon shows warm admiration for Callicratidas, whose forthrightness, chivalry and

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<sup>1</sup> E.g. A.J. Woodman, *Rhetoric in classical historiography* (London 1988), with the reviews by myself, *History of the Human Sciences* iii.2 (1990) 317-21, and R. Brock, *LCM* xvi (1991) 97-102, and my 'Truth and untruth in Herodotus and Thucydides', in C.J. Gill and T.P. Wiseman (edd.), *Lies and fiction in the ancient world* (Exeter 1993) 88-121.

<sup>2</sup> Typical are G.K. Cawkwell in *Xenophon: A history of my times*, translation by R. Warner, introduction and notes by G.K. Cawkwell (Harmondsworth 1979) 7-49, and P.A. Cartledge, *Agésilao*s (London 1987) 61-6 (both, however, provide excellent introductions to the problems and exhibit exasperated affection for Xenophon).

<sup>3</sup> E.g. W.P. Henry, *Greek historical writing: a historiographical essay based on Xenophon's Hellenica* (Chicago 1966); W.E. Higgins, *Xenophon the Athenian* (New York 1977), especially 99-127; G. Proietti, *Xenophon's Sparta: an introduction* (Leiden 1987); V. Gray, *The character of Xenophon's Hellenica* (London 1989) (see my review in *CR* xlii [1992] 281-4); C.J. Tuplin, *The failings of empire: a reading of Xenophon Hellenica 2.3.11-7.5.27* (Stuttgart 1993) (both 'historical' and 'literary').

<sup>4</sup> G. Grote, *History of Greece* viii<sup>2</sup> (London 1851) 218-37; *Xenophon: Hellenica*, text by E.C. Marchant, notes by G.E. Underhill (Oxford 1906, repr. New York 1979) xxiv-xxv, 24; H.R. Breitenbach, *Die historiographische Anschauungsformen Xenophons* (Freiburg 1950) 108; H.D. Westlake, 'Individuals in Xenophon, Hellenica', *BJRL* xlix (1966) 249-69, reprinted in *Essays on the Greek historians and Greek history* (Manchester 1969) (to which subsequent references refer); J.K. Anderson, *Xenophon* (London 1974) 70-1, and *JHS* cxi (1991) 225, reviewing Krentz (below); Cawkwell (n. 2) 43, 79n.; cf. also *YCS* xxiv (1975) 63-4; J.-F. Bommelaer, *Lysandre de Sparte: histoire et traditions* (Paris 1981) 86-7; G. Ronnet, 'La figure de Callicratidas et la composition des Hélieniques,' *RPh* lv (1981) 111-21; Cartledge (n. 2) 190; Higgins (n. 3) 10-12; Gray (n. 3) 22-4, 81-3; P. Krentz, *Xenophon: Hellenika I-II.3.10* (Warminster 1989) 145-56; C.J. Tuplin, *LCM* xvi (1991) 25-26 (reviewing Krentz); G. Proietti, *Xenophon's Sparta* (Leiden 1987) 11-25; 106-7.

<sup>5</sup> Except D. Lotze, *Lysander und der peloponnesische Krieg* (Berlin 1964) 15-26.

impatience of subservience to Persia he found far more attractive than the shrewd realism of Lysander', or Cawkwell: '[Callicratidas] was not an especially prominent figure, as far as we know, but he interested Xenophon who recorded with Panhellenist zest the succession in command'.<sup>6</sup> Such scholars scarcely seem to realise that Xenophon's own attitudes and feelings are not hard external criteria for interpreting the text but are inferences from the text. Nor do they concede the text its own logic, with the portrayal of Callicratidas one strand in a complex nexus of relationships: rather, Xenophon's Panhellenism seems virtually the sole determining factor.

Third, Callicratidas seems to inspire historians to romantic heights. Thus Grote: 'Kallikratidas, unfortunately only shown by the Fates and not suffered to continue in the Grecian world, was one of the noblest characters of his age. Besides perfect courage, energy, and incorruptibility, he was distinguished for two qualities, both of them very rare among eminent Greeks; entire straightforwardness of dealing—and a Pan-hellenic patriotism alike comprehensive, exalted, and merciful'.<sup>7</sup>

Though detractors of Callicratidas are greatly in the minority, they have produced the most critical and detailed interpretations, so with these I shall be largely concerned. Whatever the conclusion, the problem is clearly well worth discussing.

The story begins when the Spartans send Callicratidas to succeed Lysander as navarch near the end of the Peloponnesian war (406).<sup>8</sup> Lysander hands over the ships saying that 'he was handing them over as master of the sea [θαλαττοκράτωρ] and victor in a sea-battle'. Callicratidas replies that he will agree that Lysander 'is master of the sea' if he sails along the coast from Ephesus on the left of Samos (where the Athenian ships are) and hands over the ships in Miletus. Lysander replies that he will not meddle (πολυπραγμονεῖν) when another is in command, and Callicratidas then himself mans fifty ships from Chios, Rhodes and other allies, in addition to the ships he takes from Lysander, and prepares to meet the enemy (i 6.1-3).

It is immediately apparent that there are severe tensions and problems in the situation, and in the two men's contrasting personalities, and that Xenophon has shaped his material to emphasise these. But, while he has created an interpretative problem, he has not facilitated its resolution. His failure to provide interpretative sign-posts contrasts sharply with the technique of his successors, Diodorus (xiii 76.2) and Plutarch (*Lys.* 5.7), both of whom expatiate on Callicratidas' virtues.

Lysander has been highly successful. His skilful, tactful and unselfish handling of the Persian Cyrus<sup>9</sup> has resolved the Spartan navy's pay problems: Cyrus has increased the pay from three to four obols, settled arrears and given the crews a month's advance, thereby boosting morale (i 5.1-7). Lysander has also defeated the Athenians at Notium, a victory leading to Alcibiades' eclipse and withdrawal, and, ultimately, to disaster for the Athenians (i 5.11-17). 'Victor in a sea-battle' is simply the truth. Lysander's boast, however, is a challenge, as Plutarch appreciated (*Lys.* 6.1-3): will Callicratidas be able to match his achievements? (Xenophon foreshadows the key military problem of the subsequent narrative: the wisdom of the Spartan policy of changing navarchs annually.) And it is so understood by Callicratidas, when he counter-challenges that Lysander should justify his boast of mastery of the sea by sailing along the coast and exposing himself to the Athenian fleet. This counter-challenge does not recklessly endanger the Spartan

<sup>6</sup> Westlake 217; Cawkwell (1975) 64.

<sup>7</sup> Grote 218; cf. Ronnet 111; Anderson (1991) 225.

<sup>8</sup> The possible political implications (e.g. Cartledge 81) are here irrelevant.

<sup>9</sup> Gray 14-22; Krentz 135-37; Higgins 11; Proietti 10-11.

fleet to uphold his own honour:<sup>10</sup> the point is that both know that Lysander cannot accept.

Lysander's response does not meet the counter-challenge directly, for as the new commander Callicratidas is entitled to 'order' or 'tell' (ἐκέλευσεν) Lysander to make this voyage. His denial of meddling refers not to anything he might or might not now do but to what has already occurred. Lysander backs down when his own implicit challenge to a superior is counter-challenged, a pattern which reappears in his dealings with Agesilaus.<sup>11</sup>

Lysander's declining of Callicratidas' counter-challenge effectively concedes the falsity of the other element of his boast, mastery of the sea. How should we interpret this? Has Callicratidas prettily called Lysander's bluff, as Plutarch thought?<sup>12</sup> Or is the boast, while objectively excessive, a good sign, indicating desire to do praiseworthy deeds?<sup>13</sup>

On balance, we should interpret it negatively. Mastery of the sea is an enormous claim, especially for a Spartan, given the august Greek tradition of 'thalassocrats' and 'thalassocracies'.<sup>14</sup> And it is falsified by Callicratidas' response. θαλαττοκράτωρ itself is a rare word, previously applied only to cities (Hdt. v 83; Thuc. viii 63.1):<sup>15</sup> Lysander appears as an outsize individual, who arrogates to himself much wider power than the norm. Still more important, Lysander puns derisively against Callicratidas' name, and hence—by ancient assumptions—attacks his very self. Callicratidas' name proclaims him a 'fine victor', but Lysander is the real 'victor of the sea'. The pun intensifies Lysander's challenge: hence Callicratidas' reaction, which takes full measure of the challenge, cannot be regarded as excessive.

None of this detracts from Lysander's great merits as navarch, which remain a standard for Callicratidas' own naval competence. Nor can we easily forget that after Aegospotami Lysander will justify his claim. The claim has yet another resonance: before Lysander, the great thalassocrats were Minos and Polycrates, both monarchs. In as much as Lysander is a thalassocrat, whether actual or potential, his status is immeasurably greater than that of a traditional Spartan commander.<sup>16</sup> The following narrative will be partly concerned with the contrast between Lysander, the 'unspartan' Spartan and Callicratidas, the traditional Spartan *par excellence*, a contrast which has moral elements but which also forms part of an 'objective' political analysis.<sup>17</sup>

Having amalgamated the ninety ships from Lysander with the fifty he himself manned, Callicratidas prepares to meet the enemy. We cannot yet tell whether this activity is meritorious (prompt and purposeful action) or ill-judged (impetuous zeal to engage with insufficient naval experience). Now a further complication arises: Callicratidas calls an assembly of the Spartans in the area because he 'learns that he is being intrigued against by Lysander's friends' (and cannot pursue the war immediately). Lysander's friends 'not only served Callicratidas unenthusiastically but they spread the report in the cities that the Spartans made a very great mistake in changing their admirals; for in place of men who were becoming suitable and just

<sup>10</sup> Pace Gray 23-4; Krentz 145-6.

<sup>11</sup> *Hell.* iii 4 7-10 with Gray 46-9 (conceding Lysander's insubordinate behaviour).

<sup>12</sup> *Lys.* 6.2, cf. Tuplin 25.

<sup>13</sup> Gray 23 and nn. 6 and 7 on 199, cf. Krentz 145, cl. Xen. *Ages.* 8.2.

<sup>14</sup> Hdt. iii 122.2, v 8 3.2; Thuc. i 4.1, viii 63.1; S. Hornblower, *A commentary on Thucydides, Volume I* (Oxford 1991) 18ff.; T.J. Figueira, *Excursions in epichoric history: Aiginetan Essays* (Lanham MD 1993) 46-50.

<sup>15</sup> Krentz 146 (without drawing my conclusion).

<sup>16</sup> Presumably Lysander intended another resonance: challenge to Athenian claims to thalassocracy, but this is scarcely relevant to Xenophon here, though it becomes relevant at i 6.15 (Callicratidas' own boast 'below').

<sup>17</sup> This contrast, well explored by Proietti 11-21, is already implicit in Diodorus (xiii 76.2) and Plutarch (*Lys.* 5.7, 7.1), both varying dependent upon Ephorus. I write 'objective', because it *may* be Xenophon's considered view that 'unSpartan' Spartans ultimately ruined Sparta; if so, 'objective' analysis has moral implications.

beginning to understand naval matters and who knew well how to handle people, they frequently sent out men unacquainted with the sea and unknown to the people there; and they ran the risk of suffering some disaster because of this'<sup>18</sup> (i 6 4).

This complication invalidates any simple pro- or anti- reading of the situation. The narrative implies that Lysander's power exceeds normal constitutional limits and that his friends'<sup>19</sup> 'intriguing', 'unenthusiastic service', and public questioning of a Spartan policy outside the control of Callicratidas, the new constitutional commander, are all reprehensible and undermine Lysander's denial of meddling. Yet the criticisms of Spartan policy have validity. The previous narrative has shown Lysander as 'suitable', 'understanding of naval matters', and 'skilful in handling people' (his own and Cyrus; his initially less successful handling of Callicratidas avoided open confrontation). Callicratidas, however, a Spartan from home, is 'unacquainted with the sea' and 'unknown to the people there'; and the Spartans later 'suffer some disaster' under him. Thus the question of his competence becomes increasingly pressing.

Callicratidas makes a formal speech to the assembled Spartans. Xenophontic speeches (it is agreed) characteristically explore ἦθος ('character') and moral questions.<sup>20</sup>

Ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀρκεῖ οἴκοι μένειν, καὶ εἴτε Λύσανδρος εἴτε ἄλλος τις ἐμπειρότερος περὶ τὰ ναυτικὰ βούλεται εἶναι, οὐ κωλύω τὸ κατ' ἐμέ· ἐγὼ δ' ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς πεμφθεὶς οὐκ ἔχω τί ἄλλο ποιῶ ἢ τὰ κελευόμενα ὡς ἂν δύνωμαι κράτιστα. ὑμεῖς δὲ πρὸς ἃ ἐγὼ τε φιλοτιμοῦμαι καὶ ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν αἰτιάζεται, ἴστε γὰρ αὐτὰ ὡσπερ καὶ ἐγώ, συμβουλευέτε τὰ ἄριστα ὑμῖν δοκοῦντα εἶναι περὶ τοῦ ἐμὲ ἐνθάδε μένειν ἢ οἴκαδε ἀποπλεῖν ἐροῦντα τὰ καθεστῶτα ἐνθάδε (i 6.5).

'I for my part am content to stay at home, and if Lysander or anyone else claims to be more experienced in naval matters, I do not hinder him as far as I am concerned; but it is I who have been sent by the city to the ships and I cannot do anything other than carry out my orders as best I can. But you for your part, with regard both to my ambition and to the accusations made against our city—for you know them just as I do—give me whatever advice seems best to you concerning my staying here or sailing away home to report the situation here.'

Whereupon 'no one dared say anything other than that he should obey the people at home and do the things for which he had come' (i 6.6; the wording echoes Callicratidas').

Callicratidas' detractors think the speech shows inability to handle people. First, they argue that despite the normal association of ambition with obedience to the orders of the city<sup>21</sup> Callicratidas' exchange with Lysander suggests a more personal ambition, hence his professed unconcern about Lysander's claims rings hollow. Not only, however, does this interpretation depend on a suspect reading of that earlier exchange, but it misses the argument's logic: on a purely personal level Callicratidas does not care about Lysander's claim, but, given that he has been appointed commander, he is naturally 'ambitious' to fulfil orders.

Secondly, they argue that the speech employs threats instead of persuasion. This criticism seems misguided. Why should obeying orders not be regarded as normal and desirable? And Callicratidas does *not* tell the Spartans that *he* has to obey orders, *therefore* they must too; rather, he asks them to give what they regard as the best advice in the light of *two* factors: first, his ambition to fulfil orders to the best of his ability, second, the accusation that the Spartan policy of changing admirals is wrong. The former provides some reassurance as regards the wisdom of his appointment (he is keen to perform well), the latter explicitly permits the Spartans to take account of the wisdom of that policy in their advice. Nor does Callicratidas

<sup>18</sup> There are textual problems: the Loeb gives good sense.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Diod. xiii 70.4; Plut. *Lys.* 5.3-5, 22.3-4; they underpinned the notorious decarchies.

<sup>20</sup> Gray 79-140; Krentz 146; J. Hatzfeld, *Xénophon Hélléniques* i (Paris 1954) 11.

<sup>21</sup> Gray 81 n. 1 cites K.J. Dover, *Greek popular morality in the time of Plato and Aristotle* (Oxford 1974) 230-2.

‘threaten’ them: of course, if he returns home, he will report the situation at sea. It is true that Callicratidas is suggesting to the Spartans the logic of their discontent, but that is in the nature of things. Naturally enough, none of the Spartans ‘dared’ to advise Callicratidas anything other than to fulfil his orders, but it is a gross misrepresentation to ascribe this to threats. Rather, by suggesting to the Spartans the logical consequence of their behaviour and thus securing their compliance, Callicratidas repeats his success over Lysander. The pattern of events is essentially the same.

Thirdly, Callicratidas’ critics find the style (brief, terse sentences unlike the surrounding narrative, insistent use of the personal pronoun, emphatic repetition of the word ‘here’ in the final statement) harsh and egotistical. This judgement, too, seems misguided. Like many speeches in Greek literature, Callicratidas’ is simply constructed out of a series of contrasts: the first between ‘I’ and ‘you’ (Ἐμοὶ μὲν ... ὑμεῖς δὲ), the second, within the ‘I’ section, between Callicratidas’ own feelings and the orders he has received from Sparta (Ἐμοὶ μὲν ... ἐγὼ δ’), the third between ‘I’ and ‘the city’ (ἐγὼ τε ... ἡ πόλις). The whole is ring-structured. The speech’s brevity and syntactical simplicity reflect the speaker’s Spartan identity.

The general construction and ring structure, with the variation between ‘stay at home’ at the beginning and ‘staying here or sailing off home’ at the end, are far from maladroit. The extensive use of the personal pronoun is not offensive but inevitable when Callicratidas’ own status is at issue, and, so far from obtruding his own ego, Callicratidas expressly minimises his own claims to competence by comparison with Lysander’s or anyone else’s. It is true that there is a certain irony in the fact that he has to assert his own determination to fulfil the orders of the city, but this irony arises primarily from the refusal of others to subordinate their individualistic policies to the policies of the city.

The repeated ‘here’ partly contributes to the variation within the ring structure, and partly contrasts with ‘home’. Though simple in outline, the speech is elegant, and achieves its purpose, for the Spartans advise Callicratidas to obey his orders; their advice coincides with the only course of action open to him personally once he has been sent out as navarch. The initial division between ‘I’ and ‘you’ has been resolved and unity of purpose achieved.

Callicratidas’ modern critics also miss the speech’s positive elements. Callicratidas goes far to meeting his opponents’ objections. He tackles the question of the relative experience of himself and Lysander directly. The very fact that he makes a speech to ‘the Spartans present there’ (i 6.4) acknowledges that he is one of those ‘unknown to the people there’ (*ibid.*) and begins the process of becoming ‘known’; his self-description as a ‘stay-at-home’ also concedes some force to the criticisms of Lysander’s friends, and his words ‘more experienced’ pick up i 6.4 ‘inexperienced’. He recognises that his practical ability to fulfil orders depends on a favourable response from the Spartans in the fleet, and his failure to spell out the ground on which Sparta is criticised is tactful (avoiding public unpleasantness). He invites the Spartans present to act as his advisers and he explicitly tells them to take account of their criticisms of Spartan policy in reaching their decision.

This analysis does not exhaust the implications of this excellent speech. It also reveals Callicratidas as a traditional Spartan *par excellence* (again in implicit contrast with Lysander): Callicratidas is a ‘stay-at-home’ (as his first words show) and utterly obedient to lawful authority.<sup>22</sup>

Once accepted in the command, Callicratidas goes to Cyrus to ask for pay for the sailors. ‘Cyrus, however, told him to wait for two days. But Callicratidas, indignant at the putting-off and angry at the visitings at his gates, declaring that the Greeks were most wretched in that they

<sup>22</sup> Proietti 11-13, cf. Xen. *Lac.* 14.2, 4 and Thuc. i 70.4 (Spartan ‘home-lovers’); Xen. *Lac.* 2.2, 10; 4.6; 8.1-5; *Mem.* iv 4 15 (Spartan obedience).

flattered barbarians for the sake of money, and saying that if he reached home in safety he would reconcile the Athenians and the Spartans to the best of his ability, sailed away to Miletus; and after sending triremes from there to Sparta for money, he gathered the Milesians in assembly ...' (i 6.6-8).

Is Callicratidas criticised here for his intemperate response to Cyrus, by contrast with Lysander's skilful, tactful, and successful handling of the Persian paymaster,<sup>23</sup> or is he commended for his lofty anti-Persian Panhellenism?<sup>24</sup> Or is the point practical: 'this proud indignation of Callicratidas is a luxury that the Spartan can little afford', and in general 'the Spartan failure (in *Hell.* i 1-3) to use effectively the wealth available to them was the result not of discouragement or simple ignorance but of a noble denial of the necessity of money and a noble ignorance of its uses'<sup>25</sup>

Clearly, Xenophon intends a comparison with Lysander's relations with Cyrus, and since those were so successful, it is easily assumed that Callicratidas must be implicitly criticised. But the two situations differ in that Cyrus met Lysander immediately, whereas he tells Callicratidas to wait two days, so Callicratidas has a harder task. It is true that even though Lysander meets Cyrus immediately, he has to await the right moment, and exploit it, to secure the money, but he has an initial advantage.

Callicratidas' reaction to the delay may seem excessive. He is motivated partly by anger, which may expel judgement (so Higgins, Gray and Krentz).<sup>26</sup> But anger does not *necessarily* do this, even in the moralistic Xenophon (*cf.* e.g. *Hell.* iii 4.8). Nor is the charge that 'Kallikratidas' impatience ... again reveals his failure to put his troops' well-being above his own ego'<sup>27</sup> necessarily compelling: *if* attending Cyrus' pleasure is demeaning and unhellenic, that *could* be legitimate reason for seeking help elsewhere.

What, then, of the *quality* of Callicratidas' sentiment? While it is true that the topic of the reconciliation of Athens and Sparta never recurs within Xenophon's account of the Peloponnesian war, it is a major theme of several of the big speeches later in the work.<sup>28</sup> Of course any link with these later passages raises the question of the *Hellenica's* unity. But even if one thinks (as I do) that 'the continuation' was originally separate,<sup>29</sup> one must allow (a) for the possibility of general consistency in Xenophon's views over the years, and (b) for the fact that *as it stands* the 'continuation' is part of the same text as the rest, and Xenophon himself made this join, so that (on one level) the text must be interpreted as a whole. The later emphasis on the need for reconciliation between Athens and Sparta reinforces Callicratidas' sentiment.

There are other considerations against dismissing Callicratidas' sentiment as mere personal pique. First, Callicratidas several times repeats Panhellenic anti-barbarian sentiments (i 6.8, 10, 11, 14). Second, Callicratidas' refusal to 'flatter' Cyrus seems ultimately to be vindicated (below). Third, Callicratidas' contempt for flattering barbarians for the sake of silver is paralleled by Teleutias at v 1.17 ('what would be pleasanter than to flatter no one, neither Greek

<sup>23</sup> Higgins 11; Gray 82-3; Krentz 147.

<sup>24</sup> Grote 221; Breitenbach 108; Westlake 217; Cawkwell (1975) 64; (1979) 79; Ronnet 112; and indeed Plut. *Lys.* 6.4-7.

<sup>25</sup> Proietti 13-14.

<sup>26</sup> *Cf.* Xenophon's criticism of Teleutias, whom he otherwise portrays so favourably, as guided by 'anger' rather than 'judgement' at Olynthus (v 3.7).

<sup>27</sup> Krentz 147; similarly Gray 83.

<sup>28</sup> *Hell.* vi 3; vi 5.33-48; vii 1.1-14; *cf.* vii 1.37-38; on these Gray 112-31 is excellent.

<sup>29</sup> Cawkwell 28-33 is an excellent statement of this case, Gray's book an excellent statement of the case for the *Hellenica's* overall unity, though she does not tackle the problem of i 1.1-ii 3.10 properly. Krentz 5 surveys the problem succinctly, *cf.* also Tuplin (1993) 11-12.

nor barbarian, for the sake of pay?').<sup>30</sup> Xenophon clearly represents Teleutias' speech as admirable (*cf.* v 1.4, 14, 18) and appropriate to 'the ideal commander' whom Teleutias generally represents. Moreover, Teleutias' rejection of 'flattering ... for the sake of pay' contrasts directly with, and implicitly sneers at, the policy of Antalcidas, who advocated and practised full co-operation with Persia (i.e. 'neither Greek' is a foil to emphasise rejection of 'flattering barbarians'). If, then, the parallel is designed, it must validate Callicratidas' sentiment retrospectively; but even if it is not, it may still illustrate a general attitude of which Xenophon (sometimes) approved. Naturally Xenophon's own chequered career makes it unlikely that his attitudes both to the Persians and to Athenian-Spartan relations are simple; nevertheless, Callicratidas' Panhellenic sentiments find an echo in a strand of Xenophon's thought, one particularly strong in the last years of his life, when the bulk of the *Hellenica* was probably composed.<sup>31</sup>

Other criticisms of Callicratidas' behaviour seem artificial. It is true that Callicratidas does not make Teleutias' further point, that it is best to take what you need from your enemies,<sup>32</sup> but he implies this to the Milesians (below) and he certainly practises it. Nor is there any inconsistency between Callicratidas' Panhellenic sentiments and his behaviour: he will try to reconcile Athens and Sparta if he gets home safely,<sup>33</sup> meanwhile his job remains the same—to fight the Athenians in the eastern Aegean.<sup>34</sup>

At the Milesian assembly Callicratidas makes another speech:

Ἐμοὶ μὲν, ὦ Μιλήσιοι, ἀνάγκη τοῖς οἴκοι ἀρχουσι πείθεσθαι· ὑμᾶς δὲ ἐγὼ ἀξιώ προθυμοτάτους εἶναι εἰς τὸν πόλεμον διὰ τὸ οἰκοῦντας ἐν βαρβάροις πλείστα κακὰ ἤδη ὑπ' αὐτῶν πεπονθέναι. δεῖ δ' ὑμᾶς ἐξηγεῖσθαι τοῖς ἄλλοις συμμάχοις ὅπως ἂν τάχιστα τε καὶ μάλιστα βλάπτωμεν τοὺς πολεμίους, ἕως ἂν οἱ ἐκ Λακεδαιμόνος ἤκωσιν, οὓς ἐγὼ ἐπεμψα χρήματα ἄξοντας, ἐπεὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε ὑπάρχοντα Λύσανδρος Κύρω ἀποδοὺς ὡς περιττὰ ὄντα οἴχεται. Κύρος δὲ ἐλθόντος ἐμοῦ ἐπ' αὐτὸν ἀεὶ ἀνεβάλλετό μοι διαλεχθῆναι, ἐγὼ δ' ἐπὶ τὰς ἐκείνου θύρας φοιτᾶν οὐκ ἐδυνάμην ἐμαυτὸν πείσαι. ὑπισχνούμαι δ' ὑμῖν ἀντὶ τῶν συμβάντων ἡμῖν ἀγαθῶν ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ ᾧ ἂν ἐκεῖνα προσδεχώμεθα χάριν ἀξίαν ἀποδώσειν. ἀλλὰ σὺν τοῖς θεοῖς δεῖξωμεν τοῖς βαρβάροις ὅτι καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ἐκείνου θουμάζειν δυνάμεθα τοὺς ἐχθροὺς τιμωρεῖσθαι (i 6.8-11).

'I for my part, Milesians, must obey the rulers at home; but I think it proper that you for your part should be most enthusiastic for the war because of the fact that you live among barbarians and have already suffered very many evils from them. And you should as leaders show the other allies<sup>35</sup> how we may most quickly and most effectively harm the enemy, until those whom I sent to bring money have come from Sparta, since Lysander has gone away having given back to Cyrus the money that was here as if it were superfluous. When I went to Cyrus he kept putting off talking with me, and I could not persuade myself to keep visiting his gates. But I promise you that I will make proper recompense for the good results that accrue to us in the time during which we are awaiting that money. Let us, with the help of the gods, show the barbarians that we can punish our enemies without paying court to *them*.'

<sup>30</sup> Cawkwell 249-50; Cartledge 195.

<sup>31</sup> Xenophon's Panhellenism: e.g. Cawkwell 39-41, 249-50 and *CQ* xxvi (1976) 66-71, especially 71; Cartledge 180ff.; *contra* S.W. Hirsch, *The friendship of the barbarians: Xenophon and the Persian Empire* (Hanover NH 1985), concluding (141): 'Panhellenism is not [outside the *Agésilas*] a significant component of Xenophon's thought'. It depends on 'significant'; Panhellenism plays some role in Xenophon's thought. The *Hellenica*'s dating is controversial (and connected with the problem of unity), but for a late dating of c. 355 for most of it see e.g. Cawkwell 17f.; Higgins 101; Tuplin (1993) 31.

<sup>32</sup> Krentz 147; for the Spartan ideal of waging war at enemy expense Proietti 17 n. 15 cites not only *Hell.* v 1.17, but also *Ages.* 1.8, *Lac.* 12.6-9, *Cyr.* iii 3.16 and *Oec.* 11.8.

<sup>33</sup> Krentz 147 comments: 'Kallikratidas' attitude makes his safe return seem doubtful', which I find excessive; of course, Kallikratidas' 'if' may acquire retrospective tragic irony, especially as tragedy becomes the model for his ultimate failure (below).

<sup>34</sup> Tuplin 25, *contra* Krentz 147.

<sup>35</sup> Brownson's excellent Loeb translation of ἐξηγεῖσθαι.

Here again, the claim that Callicratidas deploys terror<sup>36</sup> is misconceived. His opening remark has two purposes: first, to reiterate the reasonable point that as commander he has no choice but to obey the authorities at home (a position just endorsed by the Spartan assembly); second, to distinguish between his role and the Milesians': he has to prosecute the war and so he needs their enthusiastic cooperation. The wording echoes the earlier description of Lysander's friends as 'serving unenthusiastically': Callicratidas has again to deal with the problem of virtual mutiny. It is true<sup>37</sup> that as allies the Milesians are in one sense in a different category from the Spartans under Callicratidas' command, but in another sense they are not, since, as immediately emerges, they include some of Lysander's friends, who are known to be actively opposing Callicratidas. The Milesians ought to show enthusiasm because they are Greeks living among barbarians and have in the past suffered very many ills from them. The reference here is primarily the Persian capture of Miletus in 494; in a Greek political speech there is nothing odd about invoking an event so long ago, especially in the context of τὰ Μηδικά, as many examples in both Thucydides and Xenophon show. Clearly, there is an implication that the Persians may again be a threat, nor is the implication unreasonable, given the equivocal behaviour of Tissaphernes and other Persians (cf. e.g. i 5.9).<sup>38</sup>

But Callicratidas also appeals positively to Greek patriotism. This appeal is no more inconsistent than at i 6.7 and it is coupled with the promise of proper material compensation when the money comes from Sparta (though it is implied that successful action against the enemy will also produce funds; note the reciprocal 'proper' compensation for 'proper' Milesian behaviour). Is this promise, apparently so reasonable, deconstructed by earlier or later events? Proietti<sup>39</sup> invokes Thuc. viii 57, 83 and 89: 'we know ... that the Milesians have had experience of harboring the Spartans when the latter were without constant support from the Persians: money never came from Sparta, and there had been danger that the unpaid sailors would turn to robbing their hosts'. But it is doubtful that we should recall the *details* of Thucydides viii as we read *Hellenica* i (as the opening words notoriously indicate). It appears also that the requested money from Sparta never came,<sup>40</sup> but it seems unreasonable to blame Callicratidas.

We here learn (and must accept) that Lysander still had money, which he returned to Cyrus. Krentz comments: 'Kallikratidas' ungenerous attitude towards Lysandros cost him (and, more importantly, his men) financially'. But we do not know that Lysander returned this money after meeting Callicratidas.<sup>41</sup> Even if it was after, it was Lysander who initiated hostilities. This information, anyway, reflects poorly on Lysander, for regarding the connection with Cyrus as his own private connection rather than Sparta's.<sup>42</sup>

Why does Callicratidas reveal this information? Proietti refers to 'Callicratidas' startling accusation of what amounts to treachery on Lysander's part', which in his view alerts the Milesians to the danger of reprisals should they fail to support the Spartan cause. This seems

<sup>36</sup> Gray 83; Krentz 147.

<sup>37</sup> Proietti 14.

<sup>38</sup> Ionian attitudes to the Persians at this period: D.M. Lewis, *Sparta and Persia* (Leiden 1977) 115-23, for whom Callicratidas' speech may reflect reality.

<sup>39</sup> Proietti 15.

<sup>40</sup> Krentz 147.

<sup>41</sup> Krentz 148; Tuplin 25.

<sup>42</sup> Proietti 15; Plut. *Lys.* 6.1 makes Lysander return the money before meeting Callicratidas, but this cannot be used to interpret Xenophon (though it may have historical value). Of course the tensions between patriotism and international aristocratic relationships raised difficult issues *historically*: G. Herman, *Ritualised friendship and the Greek city* (Cambridge 1987), especially 156-61; I doubt their difficulty in Xenophon's *text* here.



implausible: in the first instance Callicratidas is simply explaining why one of his two possible sources of money has proved unavailing, though there is of course also some denigration of his rival.

As for his other possible source, it is true<sup>43</sup> that Callicratidas' version of his dealings with Cyrus is exaggerated by comparison with the narrative, an exaggeration intensified by verbal parallels. But the exaggeration is not simply dishonest or blinkered; it forms part of Callicratidas' general thesis about the unreliability of the Persian barbarians, and thus has a certain persuasive force. Hence Callicratidas can project himself as a model of financial probity by contrast both with Lysander and Cyrus.<sup>44</sup> Two other persuasive elements in the speech are Callicratidas' appeal to the Milesians' pride as leaders of the allies and the final appeal to the help of the gods (so typical of the Xenophontic ideal general). The speech ends with a concentratedly satisfying triple (!) ring structure: τοῖς βαρβάροις picks up ἐν βαρβάροις, ἄνευ τοῦ ἐκείνους θαυμάζειν picks up section 10, τοὺς ἐχθροὺς τιμωρεῖσθαι picks up βλέπουμεν τοὺς πολεμίους. The initial division between 'me' and 'you' has been resolved into a unifying 'us' (in this, as in other respects, Callicratidas' second speech resembles his first). The Greek which Xenophon gives Callicratidas is enormously better than his modern detractors realise.

And it works: 'when he had said this, many arose, particularly those who were accused of opposing him, and, fearful, proposed a grant of money, offering private contributions as well'.

Why are they 'fearful'? Partly no doubt because of Callicratidas' reminder of the potential Persian threat, partly also because some of them are 'those accused of opposing' Callicratidas, whose speech has again put them on the spot. But to describe the speech as an exercise in 'terror' is a gross misrepresentation.

With this money and money from Chios, Callicratidas can give his men five drachmae each (about a week's pay). For the moment he seems to have solved the financial problem, and that without further recourse to Cyrus. It is difficult to interpret this description as unfavourable: the good commander secures pay for his soldiers. It is true that by comparison with the large sums obtained from Cyrus by Lysander, five drachmae is very little, and we may well sense this.<sup>45</sup> But this money is only a downpayment; the real money will come, in accordance with Teleutias' policy, from 'punishing the enemy'. It is also true, as Proietti points out, that 'Callicratidas' want of ample funds compels him to wage war vigorously', but it is equally true, and emphasised by Xenophon from the beginning, that Callicratidas would always have waged war vigorously: hence his military activity is not compromised by suspect motivation.

The capture of Methymna, which had an Athenian garrison and an 'atticising' government, illustrates Callicratidas' military vigour. We sense another pun: Callicratidas, named in i 6.14, captures Methymna κατὰ κράτος (i 6.13).

This brings the required money but the prisoners present a problem: 'all the captives'<sup>46</sup> Callicratidas assembled in the market-place; and when his allies urged him to sell into slavery the Methymnaeans as well as the Athenians, he said that while he was commander no Greek would be enslaved if he could help it. On the next day he let the Methymnaeans go free, but sold the members of the Athenian garrison and such of the captives as were slaves; then he sent word to Conon that he would stop him committing adultery with the sea' (i 6.14-15).

<sup>43</sup> Gray 82.

<sup>44</sup> Both Diodorus and Plutarch stress Callicratidas' extreme financial probity.

<sup>45</sup> Proietti 16.

<sup>46</sup> Proietti 17, n. 16, has an excellent note on the ambiguous ἀνδράποδα.

How is this to be interpreted? On one view,<sup>47</sup> Callicratidas' response to his allies shows great nobility; on another,<sup>48</sup> there is a disturbing gulf between the apparent nobility of his sentiments and his behaviour. It is anyway noteworthy that both Callicratidas' sentiment and behaviour are more philanthropic than the attitude of 'the allies', who simply want the Methymnaeans enslaved.<sup>49</sup> This superiority remains, whatever we think of the sequel, and renders still more implausible the contention that Callicratidas has 'terrorised' those allies. They are now certainly 'enthusiastically' engaged in 'punishing the enemy', as exhorted by Callicratidas.

The enslavement of the Athenian garrison coheres with normal military practice, yet there remains a discrepancy between this practice and Callicratidas' Panhellenist sentiment, especially when delivered with such personal emphasis. As throughout the narrative, but especially at i 6.6, Callicratidas is highly conscious of his own role. The effect of the incident is mixed: Callicratidas utters a noble sentiment and one which naturally coheres with a strand of Xenophon's own thinking, and he behaves better than the allies; on the other hand there is some disparity between sentiment and behaviour.

Callicratidas' message to Conon has suggested to scholars intemperate vulgarity<sup>50</sup> or even sexual repression.<sup>51</sup> The remark is certainly boastful and somewhat vulgar, especially by contrast with the civilised 'charm' of Xenophon's own style. One might say that Callicratidas' ἦθος as here revealed is very different from Xenophon's own. More important, the implication is that the sea belongs to Callicratidas (being his 'lawful bride'). Hence Callicratidas has now arrived at the position of regarding *himself* as θαλαττοκράτωρ.<sup>52</sup> If Lysander was implicitly criticised for this boast, is Callicratidas also criticised? There is at least pronounced irony here. The remark is also a challenge to Conon, and one which will introduce a military duel between the commanders of the opposing forces. The element of challenge and competition that marked the relations of Callicratidas and Lysander is now transferred to a still more tense and serious context. So the question now is: how will Callicratidas' claim to naval dominance hold up in practice?

For a long time the answer is: extremely well. Through Callicratidas' swift action, Conon loses thirty ships and is blockaded within Mytilene. 'Callicratidas summoned the Methymnaeans to come to his aid with their entire force and brought his army from Chios; and money came to him from Cyrus' (i 6.18). Thanks to his success at Methymna Callicratidas is able to mobilise the whole people of Methymna (now united after the civil strife which allowed the Athenians control of the city); and even Cyrus finally produces the money originally requested and does so unprompted. The inference that Callicratidas has mishandled Spartan finances is untenable. It seems too that Callicratidas has been further vindicated in that it was not after all necessary to flatter Cyrus.

The build-up to the battle of Arginusae is described at length and in detail and with ever greater expectation. This could be the decisive moment of the Peloponnesian war; it is hard for the reader not to regard this campaign as comparable to, and anticipating, the Aegospotami campaign. With extreme difficulty Conon succeeds in getting word to Athens, because 'the

<sup>47</sup> Especially Grote 224.

<sup>48</sup> Higgins 11; Krentz 148.

<sup>49</sup> Diod. xiii 76.5 regards Callicratidas' behaviour at Methymna as clement, though (again) the evidence of another text cannot be used to interpret Xenophon.

<sup>50</sup> Higgins 11; Gray 24; Krentz 149.

<sup>51</sup> Tuplin 26.

<sup>52</sup> Proietti 18.

blockaders were careless' (i 6 20). Had Conon failed, the war would have been over.<sup>53</sup> Yet Callicratidas immediately scores another success: again moving with remarkable speed, he captures ten ships from one of Conon's commanders.

The Athenians mount a desperate and extraordinary mobilisation of ships and men, including slaves and knights, to a total of 150 ships. Callicratidas responds by leaving 50 ships at Mytilene under Eteonicus,<sup>54</sup> and himself anchoring at Cape Malea in Lesbos<sup>55</sup> with 120 ships. We now know that Callicratidas' navy is numerically inferior to the Athenian. Callicratidas plans an unexpected midnight attack but a thunderstorm intervenes. This is his first setback since he began actual military operations, but Krentz<sup>56</sup> is hardly right that the detail 'contrasts Kallikratidas with Alcibiades, who used a storm successfully at Kyzikos' (i 1.16): no commander, however good, can be expected to control the weather. At daybreak Callicratidas sets sail for Arginusae.<sup>57</sup>

Xenophon describes the formations of each side, emphasising that Athenian strategy was to prevent a *διέκπλους*, that Spartan strategy was to achieve *διέκπλους* and *περίπλους*, that the Athenian ships sailed worse and that the Spartan ships sailed better. The detailed description further increases tension, as well preparing for the important political consequences of the battle, the trial of the generals.

Before battle begins, 'Hermon the Megarian, Callicratidas' pilot, said to him that it was well to sail away; for the triremes of the Athenians were far more numerous. But Callicratidas said that *ἡ Σπάρτη οὐδὲν μὴ κάκιον οἰκεῖται*<sup>58</sup> if he were killed, but to flee he said would be a disgrace' (i 6.32). After a lengthy engagement, when his ship rams an enemy, Callicratidas falls into the sea and disappears, the Spartans flee, and the Athenians win a speedy victory. They lose twenty-five ships, the Spartans lose nine out of ten Spartan ships and more than sixty allied ships. When Eteonicus hears of the disaster, he pretends that Callicratidas has won an overwhelming victory, thus averting a collapse of morale and further losses and saving the ships and infantry under his command (i 6.29-38).

Until Callicratidas commits himself to battle, the only implication of incompetence comes in the detail 'the blockaders were careless', but the consequences of that carelessness are great. Yet there is still all to play for: Callicratidas has been continuously successful and has displayed several of the characteristics of 'the good commander', notably the 'speed' of his operations. But by recording the exchange with Hermon, Xenophon raises the question whether Callicratidas was right to fight.

There are points on both sides. The exchange might reflect the well-known pattern of the ignored warning, familiar from epic and tragedy and from historiography influenced by them,<sup>59</sup> and, if so, Callicratidas must be behaving in an impetuous and ill-considered manner and his objective failure must be his fault. The exchange also emphasises what we already know, that the Spartan fleet was smaller. On the other hand, we also know that Hermon misconceives the

<sup>53</sup> Proietti 19.

<sup>54</sup> B.W. Henderson, *The Great War between Athens and Sparta* (London 1927) 456, opines: 'Callicratidas made his one fatal error ... the Spartan divided his great fleet'. But this was an error only if Callicratidas was certain to fight. One must anyway distinguish between interpretation of the historical facts and interpretation of Xenophon, whose tone seems neutral.

<sup>55</sup> The vexed textual problem (Krentz 152-53) is here irrelevant.

<sup>56</sup> Krentz 153.

<sup>57</sup> Scholarly debate about this battle does not concern this paper.

<sup>58</sup> The small textual problem here (Krentz 156) does not affect interpretation.

<sup>59</sup> R.B. Rutherford, *JHS* cii (1982) 156-57 (on the *Iliad*); H. Bischoff, *Der Warner bei Herodot* (Diss. Marburg 1932); R. Lattimore, 'The Wise-Adviser in Herodotus', *CPh* xxxiv (1939) 24-35; D. Fehling, *Herodotus and his sources*, trans. J.G. Howie (Leeds 1989) 203-9; Gray 148.

size of the disparity (120 against 150 is not a great short-fall), and that the Spartan ships sail better (a point Xenophon has tautologically stressed by saying first that the Athenian ships sailed worse, then that the Spartan ships sailed better). The decision to fight is not wholly irrational.

Callicratidas' reply consists of two elements: first, the statement about the effect on Sparta should he die, second the statement about the 'disgrace' of 'flight'.

The Greek of the first is often translated 'Sparta *would fare* just the same if he died' (Krentz and many others). If οἰκεῖται means this, Callicratidas' claim is falsified by the event: when he dies, the Spartans are defeated and incur the considerable loss of nine Spartan ships and more than sixty allied ships. This reading makes Callicratidas irresponsible. Anderson, however, insists that οἰκεῖται should be interpreted literally and Callicratidas is saying: 'what recks the death of ane? Sparta will be none the worse populated'. This interpretation may well be right and would maintain the distinction between 'here' in the eastern Aegean and 'home' that Callicratidas has always asserted. Nevertheless, criticism of Callicratidas would still be implied: substantial losses in the Aegean do affect Spartan 'population' at home, especially given chronic Spartan 'shortage of people'.

In any case, Callicratidas views the moral problem purely with reference to himself, without regard for the Spartans under his command. This inappropriate perspective is reinforced by the second element of his response to Hermon, which concerns only his own reputation. There has been a decline from his attitude at the earlier assembly of the Spartans, where he was indeed 'ambitious' but his 'ambition' was to do well for Sparta. The unity between himself and Sparta has been replaced by an inappropriate distinction between Sparta's interests and his own. The tension between Callicratidas' devotion to his duty to Sparta and his strong consciousness of his own individual role now inclines too heavily towards individualism.

The nobility of the sentiment 'flight is disgraceful' is therefore only apparent. And the sentiment is further undermined by the contrast with Hermon's view. At first sight, Hermon is merely saying that it would be 'expedient' or 'timely'<sup>60</sup> to sail away. But the wider moral implications mentioned help to suggest the stronger meaning: 'it is morally good to sail away'. Thus the contrast between the two views is not, as might appear, a contrast between Hermon's expediency and Callicratidas' concern (however inexpedient) with morality, but between the true morality of Hermon and the flawed morality of Callicratidas.

Finally, there is the question whether it is right to characterise the declining of battle against a more numerous enemy as 'flight'. Earlier in the narrative (i 5.15) the highly successful Lysander had declined battle with the full Athenian fleet even after success at Notium 'because of having many fewer ships'<sup>61</sup>.

In short, while Xenophon allows Callicratidas' decision to fight a certain justification (because the Spartans' ships sail better), the analysis is predominantly negative. That this interpretation is not coloured by anachronistic, modern misconceptions is proved by Cicero's remarks in *De officiis* i 84: 'When Callicratidas, as Spartan admiral in the Peloponnesian War, had won many signal successes, he spoiled everything at the end by refusing to listen to the proposal of those who thought he ought to withdraw his fleet from Arginusae and not risk an engagement with the Athenians. His answer to them was that "the Spartans could build another fleet, if they lost that one, but he could not retreat without dishonour to himself"' (translation by W. Miller).

<sup>60</sup> Καλός of time: LSJ II.1.

<sup>61</sup> Proietti 20; Krentz 156.

After this, Callicratidas' abrupt and ignominious fall into the sea seems poetically appropriate: not only does he meet 'a fate ironically befitting a Spartan—drowning' (Higgins), but he finally seems indeed 'unacquainted with the sea', or even becomes 'acquainted with it' in a ludicrous and humiliating fashion, and, as a man excessively concerned with his own repute, he achieves not glory but its reverse: disappearance (ἡφάνισθη). He even suffers a syntactical indignity: after dominating the narrative for so long, he dies suddenly within a subordinate clause.

Callicratidas' death is immediately followed by Spartan 'flight', which represents another ironic *περιπέτεια* ('reversal'): far from Callicratidas' death not mattering, it is crucial to the Spartan defeat; far from it being 'disgraceful' to 'flee'<sup>62</sup> (as Callicratidas mistakenly regarded prudent withdrawal), 'disgraceful flight' ensues precisely because of Callicratidas' refusal to 'flee'. Callicratidas' story now emerges as a typical tragic pattern of 'change' from 'good fortune' to 'bad' because of a *hamartia* (specifically the decision to fight at Arginusae, though as usual with *hamartia*-analyses, the analysis radiates well beyond the specific *hamartia*). I say 'typical', though the lightness and deftness with which Xenophon evokes it have blinded many scholars to its presence.

The spotlight now turns on Eteonicus. His adroit use of deceit against his troops in order to save them<sup>63</sup> seems to contrast with Callicratidas' directness, or, as it has now been revealed, inappropriate impetuosity. And so the Callicratidas narrative ends as it began, with a contrast between Callicratidas and another Spartan, but whereas the initial contrast between Lysander and Callicratidas worked in Callicratidas' favour, the present contrast confirms that there is indeed a critical element in Xenophon's portrayal of Callicratidas; the present contrast also seems to recall the contrast between Lysander's and Callicratidas' handling of Cyrus: in both cases directness is seen to be less efficacious than adroit obliquity.

Two later passages confirm the defectiveness of Callicratidas' leadership at Arginusae.

First, the narrative of the naval defeat and death of Peisander (iv 3.10-12) offers striking parallels to the Arginusae narrative, and Peisander has earlier (iii 4.29) been characterised as 'a man loving honour [φιλότιμον] and stout of spirit but rather inexperienced [ἀπειρότερον] at making preparations as necessary'. Further, Agesilaus responds to the news of Peisander's defeat with a ruse of the same type as Eteonicus' (iv 3.13-14): the evocations of Callicratidas' failure seem clear.<sup>64</sup>

Second, after lengthy treatments of the trial of the Athenian generals (i 7.1-35) and Eteonicus' suppression of a conspiracy in Chios (another instance of success achieved by indirect means [ii 1.1-5]), Xenophon reverts to his naval narrative at ii 1.6. The items highlighted, and the wording used, could scarcely be more pointed. The Spartan allies gather *en masse* at Ephesus and 'they took counsel about the existing situation' (as Callicratidas at i 6.5 had exhorted the Spartans to do); they decide to report the facts to Sparta (as Callicratidas would have done had the Spartans counselled against him), and (like Lysander's friends earlier) to request the reinstatement of Lysander, who retains a good reputation among the allies because of his victory at Notium. The problem of the Spartan policy of changing navarchs recurs, but now the Spartans accede to the allies' illegal request by appointing Aracus navarch, with Lysander as vice-admiral. Then, 'the ships, however, they handed over to Lysander' (ii 1.7). The narrative is back to the point 'when Lysander handed over the ships, he said that he was handing them over as master of the sea and victor in a sea-battle' (i 6.2). For all his merits,

<sup>62</sup> Proietti 20 adumbrates these points.

<sup>63</sup> On this type of stratagem, also employed by Agesilaus, see the useful analysis of Gray 149-53; Xenophon undoubtedly approves. Agesilaus' stratagem at iv 3.13-14 is significantly parallel to Eteonicus' (below).

<sup>64</sup> Proietti 105-7.

Callicratidas as a commander was not in the same class as Lysander: there is a sense in which his command was a mere interlude.

What conclusions can we draw?

First, Xenophon writes extremely well. Quietly, unobtrusively and without explicit moralising, this narrative continually poses delicate interpretative questions, whose difficulty the very diversity of scholarly response attests.

Second, the narrative is far from a straightforward representation of 'the facts': rather, the facts are selected and shaped so as to bear constantly on the problem of our military, political and moral assessment of Callicratidas.

Third, if there are from the modern historian's point of view deficiencies in Xenophon's factual record, these 'deficiencies' result not from incompetence but from artistic purpose, which, as usual in Xenophon, is also a moral purpose.

Fourth, Xenophon's portrayal of Callicratidas is mixed: by the end Callicratidas appears as over-eager to fight and over-motivated by personal considerations. But this 'conclusion' does not erase the earlier positive elements in his characterisation—the relative purity of his motivation by comparison with Lysander and his friends, his ability to achieve results through speeches, his noble Panhellenic conception, his energy, and (until the end) high military competence, though those positive elements are the other side of the same coin. Xenophon's portrayal of Callicratidas is 'consistent', but the consistency resides not in consistent criticism<sup>65</sup> but in a consistent overall view of a man whose virtues and vices were of a piece. I believe that this is the only possible interpretation of Xenophon, but perhaps now it is after all legitimate to invoke the 'authority' of Diodorus and Plutarch. There is something intrinsically implausible about the intensely critical view of Callicratidas which Higgins, Gray and Krentz attribute to Xenophon, when it is so very far from the view of Diodorus and Plutarch, whose factual material is extremely close to Xenophon's. Rather, the ancient view of Callicratidas is basically unified, even though Xenophon's is far subtler than Diodorus' or Plutarch's. It is interesting also to speculate whether Cicero's view of Callicratidas reflects his interpretation of Xenophon.

Fifth, Xenophon is greatly interested in the contrast between the traditional Spartan type represented by Callicratidas and the unspartan Spartan Lysander, and in its political and military consequences; these consequences seem highly ambiguous: Lysander emerges at the end as the more effective commander, but Callicratidas is also highly effective *up to a point*; conversely, Callicratidas is in general the nobler figure, but at the end the diminution of his moral status is accompanied by a diminution of his military effectiveness; yet Lysander himself remains a deeply ambiguous, even a sinister, figure.

Sixth, Xenophon is profoundly concerned with a certain sort of truth, namely the Aristotelian truth 'what sort of man was Callicratidas?'.<sup>66</sup> We may even hope to have disinterred the historical Callicratidas from Xenophon's text.

The seventh factor concerns the ultimate purpose of Xenophon's portrayal. Of course, to some extent in Xenophon's brand of historiography commemoration, especially of virtuous behaviour, is its own justification. The study of Callicratidas also forms part of Xenophon's continuous quest to analyse and define the qualities of the good commander. But more, Callicratidas appears as a kind of inchoate figure, a man of high ambition whose performance does not quite measure up, a man of noble sentiment, who cannot implement the sentiment to the last degree, a man in some respects before his time. Now the ultimate 'meaning' of the *Hellenica* remains elusive, but many scholars agree that at least the end of the work strongly

<sup>65</sup> Pace Gray 83.

<sup>66</sup> I discuss ancient historical writers' preoccupation with 'universal truths' in *Plutarch: Cicero* (Warminster 1988) 41-42, and in my Exeter paper (n. 1).

conveys the moral and political bankruptcy of the endless quest for ‘empire’ and ‘hegemony’ on the part of the three leading Greek states, Thebes, Sparta and Athens: hence the overriding need for peace and reconciliation within Greece.<sup>67</sup> If this interpretation is sound, as I believe it is, then in the architecture of the *Hellenica* as a whole Callicratidas stands as a sort of prophetic or anticipatory figure who articulates, imperfectly, Xenophon’s final views on the best way forward for Greece. One might even analyse his sentiment about the need for reconciliation between Sparta and Athens as ‘suspension of thought’, the technique (a very important one in ancient literature) ‘of putting an idea into the reader’s mind only to return to it later’.<sup>68</sup> Those historians, both ancient and modern, who hopelessly romanticise Callicratidas are responding to something real and inspiring in Xenophon’s portrait.

To conclude: Xenophon’s portrayal of Callicratidas contains both positive and negative elements; the former preponderate overall, but the latter predominate at the end. Both contribute to a portrait which is multi-layered and multi-functional, a superb example of Xenophon’s mastery in creating complexity and density of meaning out of apparent simplicity.

J. L. MOLES

*University of Durham*

<sup>67</sup> Higgins 115-118; Cartledge 63; Proietti 108-11; Gray 179-81, and, rather differently, Tuplin, *PCA* lxxiv (1977) 26-7, and Tuplin (1993) 163-8.

<sup>68</sup> Woodman (n. 1 above) 122 (with bibliography on 147 n. 13); cf. also my own (brief) discussions in *PLLS* vi (1990) 373 n. 25, and *PLLS* v (1985) 37f. and 56 n. 29, where it is argued that such ‘marker references’ can have the function of anticipating final interpretative ‘solutions’.